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The Geography of Fear: Regional Ethnic Diversity, the Security Dilemma and Ethnic War

Uppsala University, Sweden

This article explores to what extent the security dilemma through geographically induced first-strike advantages is a contributing cause of ethnic warfare. If there are possibly decisive advantages to be gained from striking the first blow, both temptation and fear may shortcut efforts to resolve a conflict in less costly ways, and trigger massive violence. Theoretical work and case studies suggest that in ethnic conflicts intermingled settlement patterns give rise to such first-strike advantages. I test whether ethnic groups in conflict are more likely to become involved in ethnic warfare if their main region of settlement is ethnically diverse. I also include controls intended to capture other aspects of the security dilemma. In robustness tests, I add indicators of group concentration and local majority status that have been found to increase the risk of ethnic violence in previous quantitative studies. I find a strong, statistically significant association between regional ethnic diversity and ethnic warfare.

Key Words: ethnic cleansing • ethnic conflict • preemption • security dilemma • settlement patterns

European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 1, 95-124 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1354066108100054


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