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Transatlantic Competition Policy: Domestic and International Sources of EU-US Cooperation

University of Edinburgh, UK

This article employs a cross-level approach to explain cooperation in transatlantic competition policy. The explanation reveals the important role of regulators as interfaces between the domestic and international levels of analysis. Economic internationalization is a system-level cause of this cooperation, the precise effect of which is accounted for by an intervening variable (domestic politics), which is simplified with a principal-agent model. The negotiations over the 1991 EU-US Bilateral Competition Agreement suggest that, while regulators remain constrained by domestic institutions, they play an important role in explaining why the formal, transatlantic cooperative framework is largely a discretionary one created by a non-treaty international agreement.

Key Words: competition policy • cross-level analysis • discretionary cooperation • international cooperation • regulation • principal-agent model • transatlantic relations • two-level game

European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 2, 171-196 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/1354066106064506


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